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Abstract
We have designed and implemented a software library, called Identity and Certificate
Manager (ICM), for managing, using, and exchanging application-level usernames,
users' digital certificates, and cryptographic username-certificate bindings. ICM can
be used in a variety of personal communication applications, such as chat, email,
VoIP telephony, and web browsing.
As part of ICM, we designed and implemented a communication-efficient protocol,
called Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE), for exchanging certificates, usernames,
and bindings within applications. The protocol avoids sending redundant information
by remembering what information has been sent to whom; this feature is critical in
low-bandwidth networks. The protocol also implements a robust fail-over mechanism
for handling out-of-sync situations.
To illustrate the benefits of ICM and ICE, we used ICM in a plugin for a popular
chat-client, called Pidgin. The plugin allows users to engage in authenticated com-
munication over any of the chat protocols supported by Pidgin, such as Jabber and
Oscar (AIM). The plugin relies on ICE to provide assurances about users' identities
and to efficiently disseminate users' certificates.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In this thesis project, we have designed and implemented a software library, called
Identity and Certificate Manager (ICM), for managing, using, and exchanging application-
level usernames, users' digital certificates, and cryptographic username-certificate
bindings. The three main components of the library are:
* A database back-end for storing and accessing digital certificates and crypto-
graphic keys, application-username-certificate bindings, and other helpful meta-
data information about these items;
* A set of cryptographic functions for verifying digital certificates, producing dig-
ital signatures for applications' messages, and verifying these signatures using
the digital certificates; and
* A communication-efficient protocol, called Identity and Certificate Exchange
(ICE), for exchanging certificates, usernames, and bindings within applications.
The protocol avoids sending redundant information by remembering what in-
formation has been sent to whom; this feature is critical in low-bandwidth
networks. The protocol also has a robust fail-over mechanism for handling
out-of-sync situations.
The term identity, in the context of our project, means the application's notion of
users' identities, or usernames.
ICM can be used in a variety of personal communication applications, such as
chat, email, VoIP telephony, and web browsing. To illustrate the benefits of ICM, we
used it in a plug-in for a popular chat-client, called Pidgin [19]. The plug-in allows
users to have authenticated communication in Pidgin over any of the chat protocols
supported by Pidgin, such as Jabber [11] and AIM [1]. The plug-in uses the ICE
protocol to provide assurances about users' identities and to efficiently disseminate
users' certificates. The plug-in can also be used as a base for an authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, in order to enable confidential chat.
ICM is implemented using the C++ programming language and three supporting
libraries: SQLite [23], OpenSSL [17], and ACE (ADAPTIVE Communication En-
vironment) [25]. We have also implemented a set of C language wrappers around
the C++ API provided by ICM; these wrappers can be used for using ICM from C-
language applications, like Pidgin. ICM is built to be cross-platform (*nix, Windows-
cygwin [3]).
1.2 Motivation
The Internet was originally developed as a tool for academics only. Security was not
on the mind of the earliest users, and people assumed that everybody was who they
said they were.
Three decades later, the Internet is a vastly different "place." From journalis-
tic bloggers to malicious hackers, from script kiddies to identity thieves, from cam-
paigning politicians to sexual predators, the Internet's user population has changed
dramatically. Now, or perhaps several years ago, it is becoming more and more im-
portant to know who people are. The act of checking to make certain that a message
is from a particular person, and has not been modified in transit, is known as message
authentication.
One solution to the problem of authentication is called Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). A Public Key Infrastructure is based on a hierarchical trust model. The basic
concept is that if Alice trusts Bob to trust other people, and Bob trusts Charles, then
Alice can trust Charles. See Appendix A for more on PKI.
These days, Internet users have tens or even hundreds of accounts at different web-
sites, along with similar numbers of passwords (or possibly using the same password
for all their accounts). Communication has also gotten more complicated, with ever
more protocols gaining popularity. For example, IRC (Internet Relay Chat) [10] used
to be the popular protocol to use. Since then, AIM (AOL Instant Messenger) [1] has
gained widespread usage, starting around when AOL was a popular ISP. However,
in the past five or so years, Yahoo! Messenger [31], MSN Messenger [29], and more
recently XMPP [30](Jabber [11]) protocols have become popular. Users often have
accounts with services implementing these protocols. Our project hopes to help a user
manage their account-specific information and corresponding contacts' information.
We want to bind usernames from these communication protocols to certificates
from a PKI. By creating these cryptographic bindings, we add some level of certainty
concerning the user's identity to the communication protocol. Teh bindings and
certificates can then be used as a baseis for authenticated communication.
1.3 Related Work
Certificate managers have been designed and realized in the past. For example, there
is Mozilla's Network Security Services (NSS) [14] which is used by Mozilla's popular
browser Firefox [7]. A plugin for Pidgin [19], an open-source instant messaging client,
also has a certificate manager (CertMgr) to enable SSL encrypted conversations.
Two other plugins for Pidgin (Pidgin-Encryption and OTR) involve some use of
cryptography. Certificate exchange has also been pioneered; a colleague, Joe Cooley,
wrote a simple application to perform certificate exchange.
1.3.1 NSS
Mozilla's Network Security Services (NSS) [14] provides cryptography libraries for
applications such as Firefox [7], Thunderbird [26], AOL Instant Messenger [1], etc.
on many different platforms. NSS has their own certificate database, along with a
key database. They have a few commandline tools (certutil, crlutil) to give users a
way to manage these databases. They also provide tools to create and verify digital
signatures. One major shortcoming of the NSS certificate manager is the inability to
search for certificates based on specific attributes. Also, the current certificate and
key databases cannot be extended with metadata. There are plans to use SQLite
[23], a SQL database, as the backend for Mozilla Firefox 3.0.
1.3.2 Pidgin CertMgr plugin
As a Google-sponsored Summer of Code 2007 project [9], William Ehlhardt wrote a
"certificate manager" [32] to enable Pidgin users to have SSL encrypted conversations.
His stated motivation reveals a modest goal.
Pidgin doesn't currently do any certificate verification for SSL. In order
to properly do this and ensure security, a certificate manager (something
like Mozilla's) needs to be added. [32]
CertMgr uses NSS as a backend, but does nothing as far as managing other cryp-
tographic items and bindings (see Section 3.2.1 and page 26).
1.3.3 Pidgin-Encryption plugin
The Pidgin-Encryption plugin [20] provides encryption and authentication for IM
conversations. Its features tend to focus on being user friendly, e.g. public/private key
pairs are generated when the plugin is loaded. The user's public key is automatically
sent to any contacts. Known contacts' public keys are saved locally, and the user is
notified if a contact's public key changes. Keys are stored directly on the file system,
so that they can be manipulated easily.
One major downside of this plugin includes lack of support for multi-user chats.
Also, it is only available for Pidgin on Windows [28].
1.3.4 Off-the-Record plugin
The Off-the-Record (OTR) plugin [15] seems to be significantly more complex and
mature than the Pidgin-Encryption plugin. Not only does it provide encryption and
authentication, but it provides other cryptographic properties such as deniability and
perfect forward secrecy. OTR messages are not digitally signed, unlike messages from
Pidgin-Encryption. Also, OTR offers perfect forward secrecy; previous conversations
are not compromisable with current keys.
OTR also has extensive documentation on its Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE),
which uses unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange to set up an encrypted chan-
nel and then authentication inside that channel. However, like Pidgin-Encryption,
OTR is not usable inside multi-user chats.
1.3.5 Certex
Prior to this project, Joe Cooley wrote an application that uses Bonjour and NSS to
exchange certificates. Bonjour is a networking technology that allows for computers
and other devices to communicate over Ethernet or wireless (802.11) without setup.
NSS is described in section 1.3.1. With Certex, when a new machine is detected on
the network, its certificate is sent to other machines, and vice versa. Certex also
includes a plugin for what used to be Gaim (now Pidgin).
1.4 Accomplishments
What did we actually end up accomplishing? We built a cross-platform identity
and certificate manager (ICM) library, using OpenSSL's cryptography and SQLite's
database. We wrote a utility that allows users to manage their ICM directly from the
commandline. We also designed an Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE) protocol,
whose logic is embedded in our library. The protocol efficiently desseminates users'
certificates and username-certificate bindings among users. Finally, we wrote a Pidgin
plugin, which utilizes our library, and showed that our exchange protocol works as
intended. The plugin authenticates IM and multi-user chat messages using digital
signatures. The plugin balances security and usability, using informative notifications
and error messages.
1.5 Roadmap
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), we detail why we undertook this project, and what
we hoped to achieve. In Chapter 3, we explain the designs for our library, protocol and
plugin. In Chapter 4, we describe our implementations for the library, protocol and
plugin. In Chapter 5, we evaluate our work measuring the protocol's performance
in a number of different situations. Finally, in Chapter 6, we enumerate possible
extensions to our work, and then conclude.
Chapter 2
Design Goals
In this chapter, we explore the design goals for the Identity and Certificate Manager
(ICM). Our notion of "identity" encompasses email addresses, instant message user-
names, or website logins. Any information that indicates an individual person (or
possibly even a group of people) is an identity. Our use of the term "certificate" is
imprecise; what we really mean is a "cryptographic item" manager. We use the term
"certificate" because certificates are the main cryptographic items in ICM. See Sec-
tion 3.2.1 for more on cryptographic items and identity. We designed the ICM system
with four main goals in mind: functionality, security, usability and performance.
2.1 Functionality
Our vision for ICM allows a single user to access from a single repository any and
all of the cryptographic items that the user has accumulated. That repository could
be a USB drive that the user carries around. Or, perhaps sometime in the future,
the repository could be surgically implanted in the user's body. Maybe it is more
convenient (and less physically invasive) to have the repository accessible online. The
user must be able to access the repository at any time and not worry about keeping it
up to date. Applications should be able to rely on our system to handle storage and
manipulation of cryptographic objects, message signing and signature verification, as
well as secure management of identities.
2.2 Security
We want our system to be secure; we must be sure that malicious individuals cannot
tamper with our system. We need to be mindful of SQL-injection attacks and buffer
overflows. We rely on well-known cryptography for authentication, such as PKI,
CRLs, and OCSP (see Appendix A). These schemes provide us with the security as-
surances that we seek. We use digital signatures to prevent attackers from tampering
with our messages. We use cryptographic bindings to create a chain of trust between
the root certificate authority and the application-level username. After creating such
a binding, the username can "speak for" the certificate authority, attesting to the
user's identity [36].
2.3 Usability
One problem that prevents users from using security features is the lack of usability in
security tools. Some say that "security and usability are often inversely proportional"
[21], but we aim to make our ICM usable by typical computer users in common situ-
ations. Having a clean graphical user interface, as well as informative error messages
in layman's terms, are important aspects of designing a usable security application.
2.4 Performance
With technology progressing at an exponential rate [35], application performance
seems to be less important in the minds of many. However, in some situations,
performance is especially important. For example, if a message must be transmitted
via a low-bandwidth radio, e.g. a cell phone, message sizes matter. Or if a message
incurs extremely high round-trip-times because it is bounced off a satellite, then the
number of overhead messages should be kept to a minimum. In our ICM, we try to
minimize both the number and size of messages required to exchange identities and
cryptographic items.
Chapter 3
Design
In this chapter we describe the design of the ICM system. The first section summarizes
the different modules, and how they relate to each other. The subsequent sections
describe the modules themselves, in the order in which they were designed.
3.1 Modules
We designed ICM from the bottom up. That is, we originally wanted an interface
with a database that would help users keep track of their cryptographic items (see
Section 3.2.1). We also want to keep track of the users' communication contacts, and
who has which of their cryptographic items. Naturally we designed a module directly
on top of the database (DB). We built two modules and an application on top of the
DB layer (see Figure 3-1). The CryptoLib module implements all of the cryptographic
functions necessary for secure communications. The Exchange module implements
our Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE) protocol, using the CryptoLib module
heavily and storing its own state in the database. The Admin application provides
a simple commandline interface for a user to manage cryptographic items stored in
the database. A browser-based GUI gives the user a more intuitive way to manage
their database. In order to present a single high level API to other applications,
we have an Identity and Certificate Manager (ICM) layer sitting atop the Exchange
and CryptoLib modules. The c_icm layer consists of C wrappers around the C++
Pidgin Plugin
C icm
!CM
Exchange Admin
CryptoLib
DB
Figure 3-1: ICM Module Diagram
functions of the ICM layer. Finally, we designed a Pidgin plugin (written in C) to
use the c-icm API.
3.2 DB
The DB module represents the backend database used to store the user's crypto-
graphic items, and the state associated with the ICE protocol. In this section, we
first explore the schema in detail, followed by a discussion of why we chose to use
SQLite, and how the database can be maintained.
GUI
i~------II -- I C II
,I I
3.2.1 Schema
The database schema can be split into three main sections. First, there are the tables
representing cryptographic items; these include public keys, private keys, certificates,
shared keys, and passwords. Then, there is a table containing entities: Jabber [11]
usernames and email addresses. Finally, there are several tables relating entities and
items.
Cryptographic Items
Why are we storing cryptographic items in a relational database? We could have
easily stored all the items as encrypted files directly on the filesystem. Our reasoning
behind using a relational database is simple;
* We want to take advantage of the SQL relations. For example, we store meta-
data with foreign keys referring to items.
* Being able to search for an item based on a particular attribute is very im-
portant. Instead of simply storing binary representations of items, we extract
useful information that could help the user locate that item again. For exam-
ple, when storing a public key, we store the algorithm that it was generated for
(RSA, or DSA, or maybe ECDSA). We also store what the public key is used
for (either encryption or verification).
* We organize our cryptographic items into tables based on their type; certificates
and private keys are stored in their own tables. Some items have attributes that
others do not.
Cryptographic items all have a hash column. Each item has its own definition of
a hash; for certificates, it's the hash of the embedded public key. This hash is used by
all users to refer to the same item, but the hash is smaller than the item itself. For
example, if Alice wants to know if Bob has her certificate, she could send a hash of
her certificate to Bob, saving hundreds of bytes worth of communication. To achieve
even better performance (communication savings), we can use a prefix of the hash to
CREATE TABLE certificates
id
trusted
hash
INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
BOOLEAN DEFAULT t:,
BLOB,
-- useful if trying to construct a chain of trust
ca id INTEGER,
-- fields pulled directly from the certificate
is ca BOOLEAN DEFAULT f:,
common name TEXT,
email TEXT,
organization TEXT,
organization unit TEXT,
state TEXT,
country TEXT,
caorganization TEXT,
castate TEXT,
ca country TEXT,
-- the certificate itself
certificate BLOB,
FOREIGN KEY (ca id) REFERENCES
CREATE TABLE cert rev lists
id
trusted
hash
caorganization
ca state
cacountry
cert rev list
CREATE TABLE public_keys (
id
trusted
hash
algorithm
usage
-- PEH or DER
type
public_key
CREATE TABLE private keys (
id
trusted
hash
algorithm
usage
-- PEM or DER
type
privatekey
INTEGER
BOOLEAN
BLOB,
TEXT,
TEXT,
TEXT,
BLOB
certificates (id)
PRIMARY KEY,
DEFAULT t. ,
INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
BOOLEAN DEFAULT t ,
BLOB,
TEXT,
INTEGER,
INTEGER,
BLOB
INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
BOOLEAN DEFAULT t ,
BLOB,
TEXT,
INTEGER,
INTEGER,
BLOB
Figure 3-2: Database Schema - Items
identify cryptographic items. We call this predefined-length prefix the item's "MID"
(member ID).
hash
Ox24a8402b
MID
Figure 3-3: Deriving the Hash/MID from a Certificate
The MID is used whenever referring to a particular item in communication. If
there are two distinct items which happen to have the same MID, then we iterate
through the possible matches to determine which item is being specified. The use
of MIDs in our system trades computation time and storage in exchange for less
communication. The probabilities of MIDs colliding is discussed later, in Section 3-
8. We originally wanted to use the MID as the primary key for every item's table.
However, this would have caused a big problem if two distinct cryptographic items had
the same MID. The second item would not be able to be inserted into the database,
because every primary key in a table must be distinct. Instead, we use local IDs as
primary keys which can be guaranteed to be unique. When trying to identify an item
by its MID, we simply compare to the stored hash column. However, this solution
requires us to perform frequent conversions between an item's MID and local unique
ID. The ID is used by metadata tables which are explained two sections later.
Alice's
Certificate
Message From Bob
Extract MID
Ox24a8402b
MID
Verification FailedI ry... /-%Ie ,R Ia u UA dO4sU r Jr ...... J (0
Verification Succeeded 9
Figure 3-4: Iterating Through MID Collisions (Note: this scenario is very rare, see
page 32)
Entities
The database also stores entities. Entities have a few descriptive fields, such as name
and email, as well as a hash field. Entities can be described by their MIDs in the
same way that cryptographic items are. Again, just like items, entities have their own
local unique IDs so that they can be unambiguously referred to by metadata tables
(explained below).
Metadata
The ICM database also contains several metadata tables. The most straightforward of
the metadata tables is the bindings table. A binding can be described as a relationship
in which the entity "speaks for" a cryptographic item by an entity (see Figure 3-5).
d
a=
I
Try...
CREATE TABLE entities
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
hash BLOB,
name TEXT,
email TEXT
-- associate entities with their items
CREATE TABLE bindings (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
entityid INTEGER NOT NULL,
-- references one of the item tables
item id INTEGER,
item_type INTEGER,
principal BOOLEAN DEFAULT
FOREIGN KEY (entityid) REFERENCES entities(id)
-- owners of certs that have a certificate/public key of mine
CREATE TABLE sent to cert (
-- the certificate id (not mine)
cert id INTEGER,
-- references one of the item tables
myitemid INTEGER,
myitemtype INTEGER,
myitembool BOOLEAN DEFAULT ,
my_binding id INTEGER,
my binding bool BOOLEAN DEFAULT ,
FOREIGN KEY (cert id) REFERENCES certificates(id),
FOREIGN KEY (mybindingid) REFERENCES bindings(id)
CREATE TABLE pending_binding
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
entityid INTEGER,
my binding id INTEGER,
FOREIGN KEY (entity id) REFERENCES entities(id),
FOREIGN KEY (mybindingid) REFERENCES bindings(id)
Figure 3-5: Database Schema - Entities/Metadata
For example, "alice@jabber.org" "speaks for" a particular certificate-private key pair.
Thus, each binding refers to an entity and an item, both by local IDs. Since there
are many different item tables, each binding must also have an item type field. Each
binding has its own local ID so that other metadata tables can refer to it. The last
field in each binding is a "principal" Boolean. If it is set to true, then the item
referred is the entity's principal item for that type. Each entity can have only one
item of each item type marked as principal. The idea for a principal item for a given
entity is similar to a default.
Example: Suppose the item type is a certificate. Alice has a certificate
signed by Certificate Authority 1. Then, Alice gets a new certificate signed
by Certificate Authority 2, and wants this new certificate to be used in-
stead of the first certificate. Instead of deleting the first certificate (which
may be useful in the future), the principal flag allows Alice to simply set
the second certificate to be the principal.
Bindings allow for a decoupling of a user's certificate and the user's entity. If
the user wants to change names (i.e. switch entities), there is no need to get a new
certificate. The Certificate Authority does not need to know the user's entity at the
time of the certificate generation, so the user gains a lot of flexibility. Also, if the
user's certificate expires, a new certificate can easily be bound to the old entity.
Two other metadata tables keep track of the state necessary to achieve perfor-
mance enhancements in the Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE) protocol (see
Section 3.4). The first is revealingly named sentto_cert. This table keeps track
of which items and bindings have been sent to a particular recipient. That recipient
is identified by the local ID of his/her certificate. The rest of the columns in the
table indicate which item and which binding have been sent. The item ID and item
type columns unambiguously identify an item. The binding ID identifies a binding.
The remaining two columns are Booleans, which allow the table some flexibility: the
first Boolean represents whether the recipient has the user's item, and the second
represents whether the recipient has the user's binding.
Example: Suppose Bob has sent Alice his certificate and his binding,
but Alice somehow loses Bob's binding. When Bob receives evidence that
Alice has his certificate, but not his binding, he marks the first Boolean
true (i.e. Alice has received his item), but the second Boolean false (i.e.
Alice does not have his binding). Having this information allows for high
performance recovery; Bob only needs to resend his binding, and not his
certificate.
The second metadata table which stores state for the ICE protocol is called
pending_binding (again, see Figure 3-5). A row in this table represents the fact
that we have sent our binding and certificate to the specified entity.
CREATE TABLE applications
id IIJTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT
CREATE TABLE application bindings
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
application id INTEGER,
binding id INTEGER,
FOREIGN KEY (application id) REFERENCES applications(id),
FOREIGN KEY (bindingid) REFERENCES bindings(id)
Figure 3-6: Database Schema - Applications
Example: Suppose Alice enters a chatroom, and sees "bob" and "charles".
She immediately sends her certificate to both of them so that they can
authenticate her future messages. Before she receives confirmation that
"bob" has received her certificate, she receives his certificate. Her sent_to_cert
table has no indication that she has already sent her certificate to "bob"
because she did not have his certificate at the time. The pendingbinding
serves a similar purpose to the senttocert table, except it is based on
the entity's ID, instead of the certificate's ID. In this example, pendingbinding
would contain a row that indicated that Alice had sent "bob" her certifi-
cate and her username "alice".
Application-specific data
Every application using the ICM has its own notion of identity. For example, Pid-
gin's notion of Alice's identity might be "alice3@jabber.org". Similarly, Microsoft
Outlook's [12] notion of identity may be "alice@microsoft.com". In order to represent
these different notions, we have the applications table and application_bindings
table (see Figure 3-6). The applications table simply maps each application name
(and perhaps other information in the future) to an ID. The application_bindings
table maps each application to a binding. Therefore, when an application initializes
ICM, ICM knows which binding to use. Each application can have its own binding,
while sharing information about the user's contacts.
3.2.2 SQLite
We chose to use SQLite [23] as the backend database for a number of reasons. SQLite
is a lightweight and reasonably high performance database with minimal configura-
tion. SQLite is ACID compliant (atomic, consistent, isolated and durable) and the
entire database is a single file. SQLite has a full-featured C/C++ API (well-tested
with over 98% coverage), and it is completely free (no licensing at all).
We use a single database for each user. This allows different applications to share
their items with each other. We do not, however, want to have multiple people using
the same database; we want to keep each user's information isolated for security.
3.2.3 DB Maintenance
We want to allow users to manipulate the database. Users may want to add items
manually, delete them, or perform other simple database options. While users may
use the sqlite3.exe client, they may not want such a low level view of their database.
Applications may choose to allow certain database operations (for an example, see
Section 4.8.4). We did, however, design a command line tool (Admin) to allow for
simple inserts and deletes. This tool is more user-friendly than the generic sqlite
client, but also more powerful than a high-level application's GUI. This tool allows
one to insert cryptographic items into the database from files (like certificates in Dis-
tinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [4] or Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) [18] format).
The browser-based GUI allows users to manage their database even more intuitively.
3.3 CryptoLib
This module contains all of the cryptographic operations performed by our system.
We purposely designed this module so that multiple versions could be implemented,
each using different backend cryptography libraries. This flexibility makes the system
easier to maintain, update, and extend. Some of the important operations performed
in CryptoLib are certificate validation and creation/verification of digital signatures.
3.4 Identity and Certificate Exchange Protocol
The purpose of the Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE) protocol is to provide
a mechanism for users to engage in authenticated communication. To do this, users
must exchange a binding between the application's notion of identity (i.e. username)
and a cryptographic notion (i.e. certificate; see Appendix A.1). In our efforts to make
communications secure, we must reconcile an application's notion of a user with the
cryptosystem's notion of a user. We want the user to have the flexibility to use any
valid certificate with any application. Users can exchange only their own certificates,
i.e. certificates for which they have private keys.
Depending on the situation, message authentication can be merely comforting
or highly mission critical. A digital signature is attached to every single message
sent via ICM, including messages containing certificates. Confidentiality (achieved
via encryption) can easily be implemented on top of our protocol, so we decided to
decouple confidentiality from our authentication goal.
3.4.1 ICE Overview
If performance (bandwidth/latency) were of no concern to us, we could easily attach
our identity, certificate and signature to every single message and have a simple au-
thenticated protocol. Sending the same identity and certificate in every message is
highly wasteful. This is in fact exactly the way S/MIME (secure email) (see Appendix
A.4) works; the certificate is sent in every email. Compare that with Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) which initiates every session with a seven-way "handshake" to exchange
certificates and set up an encrypted channel through which to send messages. After
the SSL connection is established, certificates are no longer exchanged. If the con-
nection ends, and is re-established, the handshake must be accomplished again to
initiate a new session.
Our ICE protocol tries to take the idea of a "session" from SSL and go one step
further. Once we receive a certificate, we store it in our database so that we can
access it in the future. In order to prevent sending our certificate to the same user
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Figure 3-7: ICE Example Timeline (common case: smart push)
more than once, we remember who has received our certificate by storing state in our
database. In general, we remember what information other users have about us to
eliminate extraneous communications.
In typical usage, ICM exchanges identities and certificates via a "smart push"
method. That is, each user's ICM consults its own data to decide whether the other
user is missing either his identity or certificate. If one or both are missing, ICM
sends the required information. The metadata that we store makes this common case
exchange very efficient.
When an unexpected event occurs, then ICM "pulls" (requests) the missing infor-
mation. These unexpected events, such as failures and other errors, are detected when
trying to verify a message's signature. ICM sends the signing certificate's MID (see
page 25) or the certificate itself in every message. When verifying a certificate, ICM
matches the MID to a certificate in its database, and uses that certificate to verify the
signature. The MID is only on the order of 10 bytes, compared to hundreds or even
thousands of bytes in a typical certificate. Of course, to achieve this performance gain,
we sacrifice simplicity in certain unlikely scenarios such as hash collisions. Collisions
are unlikely and their probability only grows with the square root of the number of
possible distinct bit strings (V 2length). For example, if we use 4 bytes (32 bits) to
represent items, then we would need on the order of a3 = 216 = 65536 items to
have a good chance of getting a collision. According to Figure 3-8, we would need to
have more than 1000 MIDs to be less than 99.99% sure that we have no collisions.
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Figure 3-8: Probability of Collisions
3.4.2 Exchange module
The ICE protocol is realized in the functions contained by the Exchange module.
All of the protocol logic is contained in two functions CREATECERTIDMSG and RE-
CEIVEMSG (described in pseudocode below). CREATECERTIDMSG contains logic
for the "smart push" scenarios, i.e. sending necessary information unrequested. RE-
CEIVEMSG is called by the recipient of any ICE message, which may trigger a "pull"
for the sender's identity or certificate.
3.4.3 ICE pseudocode
CREATECERTIDMSG (entityMID, certMID, request, cert)
1 result.type +- TYPE_CERTID_MSG
2 result.requestflag +- request
3 result.stmtLen +- LEN(myEntity.name)
4 result.stmt +- myEntity.name
5 result.timestamp +- TIME()
6 // No recipient specified
7 if entityMID = NIL and certMID = NIL
8 then result.recipient +- TYPERECIPIENT_BROADCAST
9 result.ack <- NIL
10 if certMID / NIL
11 then result.sgnrLen +- LEN(myCert)
12 result.sgnr -- myCert
13 result.cert +- TYPE_CERT_CERT
14 else result.sgnrLen +- 0
15 result.sgnr +- myCert.mid
16 result.cert +- TYPECERT_MID
17 else // We have recipient's cert, or can look it up
18 if certMID / NIL or
19 ENTITYMID2CERTMID (entityMID, certMID) = 1
20 then result.recipient +- TYPERECIPIENTUIDMID
21 result.ack <- (entityMID, certMID)
22 else // We only have recipient's name
23 result.recipient = TYPERECIPIENT_UID
24 result.ack +- (entityMID)
25 result.sgnrLen -- LEN(myCert)
26 result.sgnr - myCert
27 result.cert - TYPECERTCERT
28 // We know recipient's cert
29 if certMID 0 NIL
30 then if HASMYBINDING(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) and
31 request = 0
32 then return NIL
33 if HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindingID)
34 then result.sgnrLen +- 0
35 result.sgnr - myCert.mid
36 result.cert +- TYPE_CERT_MID
37 else result.sgnrLen -- LEN(myCert)
38 result.sgnr +- myCert
39 result.cert - TYPE_CERT_CERT
40 HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindingID) +- TRUE
41 HASMYBINDING(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- TRUE
42 entitylD - ENTITYMID2ENTITYID(entityMID)
43 PENDINGBINDING (entitylD, myBindingID) <- FALSE
44 else // We know recipient's username
45 if entityMID 0 NIL
46 then entityID +- ENTITYMID2ENTITYID(entityMID)
47 if PENDINGBINDING(entityID, myBindingID) = TRUE
48 and request = 0
49 then return NIL
50 PENDINGBINDING(entitylID, myBindinglD) -- TRUE
51 return result
RECEIVEMSG (packedMsg, packedMsgLen, sender, msgText, verif yFunc)
1 // Unpack Message
2 msg +- MSGUNPACK (packedMsg, packedMsgLen)
3 if msg = NIL
4 then error "Message could not be unpacked"
5 return NIL
6 msgText +- msg.stmt
7 // Obtain Signing Certificate (from database or message)
8 if msg.cert = TYPE_CERT_MID
9 then certMID +- msg.sgnr
10 signingCert +- CERTMID2CERTIFICATE(certMID, numCerts)
11 if numCerts = 0
12 then if msg.requestflag = TYPE_REQUEST_TRUE
13 then HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- FALSE
14 HASMYBINDING(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- FALSE
15 e.name +- sender
16 ADDENTITY(e)
17 return CREATECERTIDMSG(e.mid, certMID, TRUE, FALSE)
18 else signingCert +- BUF2x(msg.sgnr, msg.sgnrLen)
19 if signingCert = NIL
20 then error "Failed to convert attached certificate to X509"
21 return NIL
22 // Check Signature
23 if MSGVERIFY(msg.sig, msg.sigLen, packedMsg, signingCert) = FALSE
24 then error "Unable to verify signature"
25 return NIL
26 // Check to see that this message is for me
27 if msg.recipient $ TYPE_RECIPIENT_BROADCAST
28 then if msg.ack 5 NIL or msg.ack / myEntity.mid
29 then error "Message not intended for this user"
30 return NIL
31 if msg.recipient = TYPERECIPIENT_UIDMID and
32 msg.ack[ MID_SIZE ] $ myCert.mid and certMID $ NIL
33 then error "Sender has wrong certificate for you"
34 HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) - FALSE
35
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40
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HASMYBINDING(certMID, myCert.id, myBindingID) *- FALSE
entityMID +- BITS2MID(sender)
return CREATECERTIDMSG(entityMID, certMID, FALSE, FALSE )
// Check Message type
if msg.type TYPE_TEXT_MSG and msg.type # TYPE_CERTID_MSG
then error "Unknown message type"
return NIL
// Done with text messages
if msg.type = TYPE_TEXT_MSG
then return NIL
// Only CertID messages from here
// Check sender's username and binding match
if VERIFYFUNCsender, msg.stmt = FALSE
then error "Sender not verified"
return NIL
e.name -- msg.stmt
senderlD +- ADDENTITY(e)
entityMID +- e.mid
// Add certificate to database
if msg.cert = TYPE_CERT_CERT
then ADDX(signingCert, e)
if ENTITYMID2CERTMID(entityMID, certMID) > 1
then error "Entity MID collision"
return NIL
if msg.recipient = TYPERECIPIENT_UID
then error "Sender has no certificate for you"
if HASMYBINDING(certMID, myCert.id, myBindingID)
then HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) - FALSE
HASMYBINDING (certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) <- FALSE
numEntities <- ENTITYMID2CERTMID (entityMID, temp)
65 if numEntities > 1
66 then error "Entity MID collision"
67 return NIL
68 else c.mid +- certMID
69 certlD <-- ITEM2ITEMID(c)
70 INSERTBINDING(senderlD, certlD, ITEM_CERTIFICATE )
71 SETPRINCIPAL(senderID, certlD, ITEM CERTIFICATE, TRUE )
72 ENTITYMID2CERTMID (entityMID, temp)
73 if certMID $ NIL and certMID $ temp
74 then error "Username is associated with a different certificate"
75 certMID +- temp
76 if CERTMID2ENTITYMID (certMID, temp) = 0
77 then error "Can't find an entity bound to this certificate"
78 return NIL
79 if entityMID $ temp
80 then error "Username change"
81 if ENTITYMID2ENTITYID (entityMID, entityID) $ 1
82 then error "Entity MID collision"
83 return NIL
84 if msg.request_flag = TYPEREQUEST_TRUE
85 then HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- FALSE
86 HASMYBINDING (certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- FALSE
87 else if PENDINGBINDING(entitylD, myBindinglD) = TRUE
88 then HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- TRUE
89 HASMYBINDING (certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) +- TRUE
90 else if msg.recipient = TYPERECIPIENT_UIDMID and
91 msg.ack = myEntity.mid and msg.ack[ MID_SIZE ] = myCert.mid
92 then HASMYCERT(certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) <- TRUE
93 HASMYBINDING (certMID, myCert.id, myBindinglD) -- TRUE
94 return CREATECERTIDMSG(entityMID, certMID, FALSE, FALSE )
3.5 Pidgin Plugin
We designed a Pidgin plugin as an example application of ICM and ICE. The plugin
will use the ICE protocol in two separate manners depending on the mode of commu-
nication that the user chooses. In an instant message (IM) conversation, where the
user is only communicating with another single user, the ICE protocol will simply
exchange certificates (if necessary!) and cryptographic username-certificate bindings.
In a chat conversation, which is often called a "chatroom" because there may be mul-
tiple users in the room, the user must exchange certificates with all the other users
in the chat. One thing to remember, whenever a user sends a message, IM or chat,
that message is packed into the ICE protocol message format (see Section 4.6.1).
As soon as a user tries to send an IM, the ICE protocol is activated. If necessary,
the user's plugin sends his/her certificate, before sending the IM. On the other end, as
soon as the user receives a message which is tagged as being part of the ICE protocol,
that user's plugin may respond with his/her own certificate if necessary.
Chat exchanges are significantly more complicated. When a user (Alice) joins
a chat, the plugin first checks the list of users in the chat. If there are any users
to whom Alice has not sent her certificate, then the plugin sends a single message
containing her certificate and cryptographic binding to the chat. The chat server
then distributes this message to the chat's users. The plugins of the other users in
the chat may send their bindings and/or certificates to Alice if necessary. If there are
n users in the chatroom, Alice sends at most 1 message to the chat, and each of the
n users sends at most 1 message to Alice.

Chapter 4
Implementation
In this chapter, we focus on our implementation of the designs described in the
preceding chapter. We also describe coding conventions we used, as well as third-
party libraries. The format of this chapter is mostly parallel to that of the Design
chapter; we discuss the modules from the bottom up.
4.1 Coding Conventions
In our C++ code (the ICM library, Admin tool), we use lowerCamelCase for variable
names, and UpperCamelCase for class/struct names [2].
4.2 Libraries
We used 3 open source libraries in this system. First, there's the free SQLite [23]
software which has a full-featured C API. For all our cryptography needs, we used
OpenSSL (version 0.9.8e) [17]. Finally, we used ADAPTIVE Communication Envi-
ronment (ACE) [25] for our portable types and data structures
4.3 Doxygen Documentation
We used the open source tool Doxygen to produce documentation for our code. All
of our classes are thoroughly documented.
4.4 DB
The purpose of the DB class is to abstract away all of the underlying database API
calls. This allows future code maintainers/updaters to easily change the underlying
database without changing the higher level code. We specifically did not want any
SQL code in any layer higher than the DB. Since only the DB layer would be making
any direct calls to the SQLite API, we decided to open the SQLite connection in the
DB constructor, and subsequently close it in the destructor. The constructor also
checks to see if the database has been initialized with our schema. If the database is
empty, then the constructor loads the schema into the database from a file.
4.4.1 Items
Cryptographic items are represented as C/C++ structs. Our implementation sup-
ports three types of items: asymmetric keys (public and private keys), certificate
revocation lists, and certificates.
We use inheritance and virtual functions (see Figure 4-1) to maximize code reuse
and modularity. Our base class, Item, has a few fields common to all cryptographic
items. First, all Items have an integer ID which is that Item's database ID. Second,
every Item is either trusted or not. This Boolean (which defaults to true) indicates
whether the user trusts this Item to be used in cryptographic operations, or whether
it should not be used anymore. Third, every Item has a "type" which is simply an
enumeration of the different cryptographic item types. Finally, all Items have MID,
hash and hashSize fields. The hash is a bytestring produced by running the SHA256
hash over some particular part of the Item. For example, SHA256 is applied to the
public key of a certificate to produce the certificate's hash. The hashSize is the
number of bytes in the hash. The MID
in further detail in Section 4.4.3.
is a short prefix of the hash, and is explained
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Figure 4-1: Item Inheritance
Items also have a few virtual functions. First, they have constructors to initialize
their specific member fields. Second, they have destructors to properly delete the
member fields which are allocated on the heap. Finally, FORMSQL, BINDPARAM-
ETERS and SELECTEDITEMS handle SQL statement generation, binding arguments
and returning results from a SELECT statement, respectively.
* FORMSQL is called when making a query to the database. It returns a SQL
statement based on the member fields of that particular Item. It takes one pa-
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rameter which tells the function which kind of query is being prepared (INSERT
/ UPDATE / SELECT / DELETE). For example, if we wanted to generate a
SQL statement to select the certificate which is untrusted with ID=5, we would
just create a new certificate, set its ID to 5, and set its trusted field to "false".
Then we would call FORMSQL on that item, and it would produce a string like
"SELECT * FROM certificates WHERE id=? AND trusted=?;". FORMSQL is
straightforward, with one exception: handling MIDs (see Section 4.4.3). Since
SQLite provides a safe method for constructing SQL statements and all exe-
cuted SQL comes directly from our code (as opposed to user input), we avoid
the risk of SQL-injection attacks.
* BINDPARAMETERS is called to fill in the arguments in the SQL statement that
was just created with FORMSQL. In the example detailed above, BINDPARAM-
ETERS would bind the integer 5 to the first variable, and false to the second
variable. Since the same Item is used as the basis for FORMSQL and BINDPA-
RAMETERS (and presumably left unchanged between the two function calls),
the variables and their values are always going to match up.
* SELECTEDITEMS deals with the results of executing a SELECT query. Un-
like the other three types of queries (INSERTs, UPDATEs and DELETEs),
SELECTs return possibly multiple results. The SELECTEDITEMS packs these
results into new appropriate Item objects, and sets these objects' member vari-
ables according to the corresponding rows in the Item's database table. If a
column is NULL, then that variable does not get set. These new Items are
returned in a single ACE DLList, which is a doubly-linked list implemented by
the ACE library (see Section 4.2).
Our design decouples our logic from the actual schema of the database tables.
As a result, only a limited amount of code must change to support a change in the
database schema. For example, in order to add a column in the table for a private
key, a single field needs to be added to the PrivateKey struct, and a couple lines
must be added to the PrivateKey implementations of FORMSQL, BINDPARAMETERS,
and SELECTEDITEMS. As another example, if we want to add a new kind of crypto-
graphic object, we only have to design the new database table, write a corresponding
derived struct of Item, and implement the FORMSQL, BINDPARAMETERS, and SE-
LECTEDITEMS functions.
4.4.2 Entities
Entities are fundamentally different from Items in terms of what each represent.
Entities represent individual people, groups of people, or software agents. Still, the
Entity objects share many fields in common with the base Item struct. Entities have
ID, MID, hash and hashSize fields. They also have name and email fields. However,
the database treatment of Entities is very similar to Items, so Entities also have
FORMSQL, BINDPARAMETERS and SELECTEDENTITIES methods.
4.4.3 MID
The purpose of the MID is to provide a short name for a particular item (explained
in further detail on page 25). The current implementation has the MID_SIZE set to 4
bytes. As described earlier, the MID was originally intended to be used as a database
ID.
How do we use a MID to identify a particular certificate? We wrote a SQLite
extension that compares two BLOBs and returns 1 if one of the BLOBs is a prefix of
the other. So, by comparing the MID with the stored full hash, we can find all the
potential matches (rarely more than 1 - see page 32).
4.4.4 Bindings
Bindings are primarily used to associate Entities with their Items, and so the bindings
table is a many-to-many relation. If there were only one type of Item, the bindings
table could simply consist of a foreign entity_id key and a foreign itemid key.
However, since the items are spread out amongst many tables, we need an itemtype
hash
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Figure 4-2: Colliding MIDs
column to indicate the table to which item_id column refers. For example, "alice"
could be bound to a certificate, a public key, or a symmetric key.
The DB Bindings API consists of only four functions: an insert function (INSERTBINDING,
an update function (SETPRINCIPAL), and two select functions (GETPRINCIPALID and
GETBINDINGID).
* INSERTBINDING simply adds a row representing a binding to the bindings table.
* SETPRINCIPAL allows us to designate a particular binding as "principal" (de-
fault). If a user has multiple certificates, we use the principal flag to indicate
which certificate should be used for that user.
* GETPRINCIPALID gets the principal itemid of the given item_type for a spec-
ified entity_id.
* GETBINDINGID simply gets the local database's primary key for the binding.
It has several uses: (1) it is used before inserting to check that a binding is
not already in the bindings table, (2) it is used to uniquely refer to a particular
binding (see Section 4.4.5), and (3) the binding ID is used for initializing any
given application (see page 29).
4.4.5 Metadata
Metadata is defined as information about who might have my cryptographic items/bindings:
it is stored to allow for significant performance gains in the ICE protocol (see Sec-
tion 3.4). There are two database tables storing metadata: sentto-cert and pending_binding.
This metadata contains information on to whom we have sent our cryptographic items
(see Section 3.2.1). For each of these tables, there is a pair of functions essentially
amounting to accessors and modifiers.
For the sentto_cert table, all of the data for the columns are passed to the
NowHASMY function, which simply stores the information in the database. The
underlying logic can be expressed in a simple, though grammatically incorrect sen-
tence. "The owner of certID nowHasMy itemID of type itemType true/false, and
nowHasMy bindingID true/false." While the typical case involves sending both the
item and binding simultaneously, the Booleans referring to the item and binding
allow us flexibility to revise our metadata in the case of unexpected failures. The
GETHASMY function retrieves one of the Booleans referring to either the item or the
binding.
The pendingbinding table is much simpler, and the SETPENDINGBINDING either
inserts or deletes a row with the given entityID and bindingID. The GETPENDING-
BINDING returns true if there is a row with the given entityID and bindingID.
4.5 CryptoLib
In order to store and use cryptographic items, we clearly need a library that provides
some tools for manipulating them. We chose to use OpenSSL [17] over Mozilla's
Network Security Services (NSS) [14] because OpenSSL makes using elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) easier. Also, the fact that OpenSSL builds on Windows with
very little hassle is a big advantage. Not only are OpenSSL's commandline applica-
tions easy to use, it has a convenient API to its cryptography library. Finally, ICM
will be incorporated into a larger project, which already uses OpenSSL.
In order to limit the effects of our choice of OpenSSL, we perform all the necessary
cryptographic operations in this module. Similarly, all the SQLite operations are
contained in the DB layer.
The CryptoLib module has three main sets of functions. The first set of func-
tions consists of little more than shallow wrappers of underlying database functions.
The second set of functions performs some of the necessary cryptographic operations
involved in using X.509 certificates. Finally, the last set of functions performs con-
versions between various data types. The remaining functions simply set the private
member variables ocspURL, myPrivateKey, and myPKey.
4.5.1 DB Operations
The database operations are fairly straightforward. Three functions simply add cryp-
tographic items when given a path (ADDRSAPRIVATEKEYPATH, ADDXPATH, AD-
DCRLPATH). These are useful for the Pidgin plugin (see Section 4.8) and for the
commandline administrative tool. ADDX and ADDENTITY are also fairly similar to
their DB counterparts (INSERTITEM and INSERTENTITY), but they also make sure to
set their own hashes before calling their respective DB functions. NOWHASMYCERT
and GETHASMYCERT are also wrappers of DB functions (NOWHASMY and GETH-
ASMY metadata functions). Finally, the rest of the database operations functions are
used only internally by other CryptoLib functions. Instead of making them private
though, we made them public to provide a more complete, if slightly redundant API.
4.5.2 Cryptographic Operations
The cryptographic operations are the most important and interesting functions in
this API. First, we have the MSGSIGN and MSGVERIFY functions. These calculate
and verify signed message digests. Then, we have a couple of functions to calculate
hashes and MIDs (BITS2HASH and BITS2MID). Finally, we have two functions to
validate X.509 certificates.
Digital Signatures
For the MSGSIGN, we use the SHA-1 hash function to create the message digest,
and then we sign the digest with the private key (set with the SETMYPRIVATEKEY
function). In the MSGVERIFY function, we take in an X.509 object, extract its public
key, and use it to verify that the message digest does in fact correspond to the message
that we have received.
Hashes and MIDs
BITS2HASH and BITS2MID both calculate the SHA256 hash of their given bitstrings.
BITs2MID actually calls BITS2HASH and simply returns the first few bytes of the
result.
Certificate Validation
Finally, we have the X.509 validation functions. VALIDATECERTIFICATE takes in
a Certificate and returns true if the Certificate is considered valid. First, we
start building a "chain of trust" by adding to a data structure all the certificates in
the database that claim to be Certificate Authorities (CAs). If the certificate being
validated claims to be a CA, we add it as well. OpenSSL takes care of constructing
the chain of trust from the certificates we add to its X509_STORE_CTX.
If a certificate is self-signed, we do not check any Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs). Otherwise, we add all CRLs that share the same CA as the certificate we
are checking. We search the database for the CRLs that share the same organization,
state and country as the certificate we are validating. When we actually run the
OpenSSL validation, the function checks the Certificate to make sure that the current
date falls between the notValidBefore and notValidAfter fields.
The second part of validation (VALIDATECERTIFICATEOCSP) involves using the
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) (see Appendix A.3). First, we form an
OCSP request using a hash function, the certificate and its certificate authority. Then,
we pack and send the OCSP request to the URL set previously (ocspURL). If there
is no URL set, then OCSP validation is not performed. We then wait for an OCSP
response. There are only a few valid responses, and the only ones that we care about
are "good" and "revoked". "good" means that the certificate is still valid, while
"revoked" means that the certificate used to be valid, but for some reason no longer
is. The rest of the responses are all interpreted as indicating that the certificate is
not valid. We used the built-in OpenSSL OCSP client function.
If an error occurs in any part of the validation process, the user is notified that
the certificate should not be trusted.
4.5.3 Conversions
The conversion functions are mainly focused on manipulating certificates. Certificates
are found in three different forms in the system: X509, Certificate, and DER binary
format. X509 is the C struct used by OpenSSL's cryptographic libraries. Certificate
is our struct which is a subclass of Item. It has many of the fields commonly found
in certificates like commonName and organization. Finally, DER binary format is
sometimes used to store certificates as files, and it's also used to transport certificates
over the wire.
BUF2X and x2BUF are more error tolerant forms of OpenSSL's D2I_X509 and
12DX509 functions. They convert certificates stored in a buffer in DER format
into X509 objects and back, respectively. They are sure to manage memory, and
check for errors that may have silently occurred during one of the OpenSSL function
calls. c2x converts a Certificate to an X509 struct by simply calling BUF2x on the
Certificate's DER buffer.
x2c is the most interesting of the conversion functions. It converts an X509 struct
into a Certificate by populating all of the Certificate's fields. The conversion
steps are:
* Populate the certificate field by converting the X509 into a DER buffer;
* Pull out all of the fields (e.g. commonName, email, organization, state, country,
etc.);
* Extract the information about the X509's Certificate Authority;
* Set the hash of the public key and corresponding MID.
The last of the conversion functions is CERTMID2CERTIFICATE which is simply a
wrapper that tries to find a Certificate in the database that matches the specified
MID.
4.6 Identity and Certificate Exchange Protocol
In this section, we detail the ICE message format and ICE functions (found in the
Exchange module).
4.6.1 Message format
We designed the ICE message format to be as compact as possible to minimize com-
munication overhead (see Figure 4-3). The protocol involves two different types of
messages:
* a message containing the sender's certificate and identity/username, and
* a message containing some plain text (email, instant message, etc.).
Our message format accomodates both message types. The format has 13 fields,
but is quite compact. The first five fields are combined to use a single byte of space.
These are the message type (2 bits), the version (2 bits), certificate-attached (1 bit),
recipient (2 bits) and a request flag (1 bit). The message type is named to distinguish
among the two types: a certificate-identity message and a text message. We use two
bits just so that this format is a little flexible to include future types. The version
is the version of the protocol, which again allows for some future flexibility. The
certificate-attached bit indicates whether there is a certificate or just a MID from
the sender. The recipient field indicates what the sender knows about the recipient.
Either the sender knows nothing, or the recipient's username, or both the recipient's
username and the recipient's certificate. Finally, the request flag is set to true if
the sender wants the recipient to send the recipient's certificate to the sender. We
crammed all these fields into the first byte of the message so that the recipient can
parse this single byte, and have a good idea of what to expect in the rest of the
message.
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Figure 4-3: Message Format
The next field is simply a 4-byte timestamp which allows the protocol users to
protect themselves against replay attacks (assuming their clocks are reasonably syn-
chronized). While our current implementation does not make use of the timestamp,
we may defend against replay attacks with the timestamp in the future. The next
two fields are the equivalent of an email's "From:" field, so we call them the signer
fields. The first signer field is 2 bytes indicating the length in bytes of the next field.
The second field is either the sender's certificate in DER format, or the MID of the
sender's certificate. Since the MID is fixed at 4 bytes, the size field is completely
omitted. The 4 byte MID can be distinguished from a 2 byte size field and the first
2 bytes of a certificate because of the certificate-attached bit in the first byte of the
message.
The following two fields are collectively called the statement. The first is again 2
bytes describing in bytes the length of the second field. The statement can be viewed
as the payload of the message; in a normal text message, the text would be in the
statement. In a certificate-identity message, the statement is the sender's username.
The next field is the equivalent of an email's "To:" field. However, in our protocol,
we use it to acknowledge the information that we have about the recipient, so we call
it the acknowledgement field. The acknowledgement field is described by the two bit
recipient field in the first byte. If the recipient field is 0 (we are broadcasting), then
the acknowledgement field is empty. If the recipient field is 1 (we know the recipient's
username), then the acknowledgement field is 4 bytes long containing the MID of
the username. Finally, if the recipient field is 2 (we know the recipient's username
and have the recipient's certificate), then the acknowledgement field is 8 bytes long
containing the MID of the username and the MID of the recipient's certificate.
The last two fields contain the cryptographic signature of the message. All of
the previous contents are signed, and this signature (consisting of 2 bytes indicating
the length of the signature and the signature itself) is appended to the end of the
message. Every single message in the protocol is signed. By signing a certificate-
identity message, the recipient can verify that the sender does indeed have the private
key corresponding to the enclosed certificate. Also, the sender's username is signed,
forming a cryptographic binding between the certificate-private key pair and the
username.
4.6.2 Exchange module
The exchange module implements functions necessary to perform the ICE protocol.
Since the protocol is rather simple, there only six functions in the API. Three of these
functions are devoted to constructing messages. There is CREATECERTIDMSG which
builds a certificate-identity message (containing the user's certificate and username).
While this may sound simple, there is a lot of logic (see Section 3.4.3) to use and
store state with the goal of reducing the size and number of communications. If the
stored state indicates that the recipient already has this user's certificate, then a null
message is returned and nothing will be sent. There is another similar function called
CREATECERTIDMSGGroup. This function performs similar functions to CREATE-
CERTIDMSGGroup, but does so for multiple intended recipients. It is useful when
trying to broadcast out a certificate in a chatroom for example. If all of the recipients
are thought to already possess the certificate, then again, nothing will be sent. The
last similar function is CREATETEXTMSG which creates a signed text message.
The next two functions are descriptively called MSGPACK and MSGUNPACK. MS-
GPACK produces a byte string from a Msg object by simply concatenating the fields
in the proper order. MSGUNPACK does the exact opposite, but carefully checks to
make sure that the input byte string is long enough to contain the expected fields.
These packing functions take into account the local architecture's byte order by using
htonl and ntohl (host to network long and network to host long). These functions
make sure that the message's integers are sent in network byte order.
On the recipient's end, RECEIVEMSG handles the byte string by first calling MS-
GUNPACK. After a Msg object is produced, the signature is verified to ensure that the
contents are unaltered and that the message was produced by its proclaimed sender
(holder of the corresponding private key). If the recipient realizes that the message
was signed by an unknown certificate, then a certificate request with the request flag
set is returned to be sent to the original sender. If the message received is a text
message, then the contents are returned. Otherwise, the certificate is stored, and the
recipient's certificate may be sent if the sender is known not to already possess it.
4.7 Identity and Certificate Manager (ICM)
The Identity and Certificate Manager module presents a single API to applications
using the system as the back-end for the Identity and Certificate Exchange protocol.
All of the functions are designed to allow an application developer to easily take ad-
vantage of the entire system's functionality. With the exception of the portable ACE
data types, none of our internal data types are exposed. The functions are mostly
thin wrappers around Exchange and CryptoLib functions. The only exceptions are
CREATETEXTMSG, its sibling functions; CREATECERTMSG and CREATECERTMSG-
GROUP, and their counterpart RECEIVEMSG. These all do packing and signing for
the application developer. By abstracting all the lower level details away, we simplify
the application developer's job.
4.8 Pidgin Plugin
Pidgin is the new name of the open-source instant messenger client formerly known
as Gaim. Pidgin is designed to be easily extended by providing an extensive API
available to plugins. We decided to develop a Pidgin plugin to use and test our ICM
library and ICE protocol.
We do not allow users to have aliases for other users or chats, because we often use
the name of the conversation to retrieve the username. Aliasing prevents those from
necessarily being equivalent. In our plugin, we often need to make use of the "name"
of a particular IM or chat conversation, which can be masked by a user-specified alias.
4.8.1 C wrappers
Because Pidgin is written in C, we wrote thin C wrappers around our C++ class
methods (see Appendix C for an example).
4.8.2 Base64
The MSGPACK function returns a binary string which is not even necessarily null-
terminated. In fact, the byte string may have one or more null characters in it.
Because XMPP requires text-only strings, we encode the message in Base64 format.
Base64 uses lower case and upper case letters of the alphabet, the ten numerals 0-9,
and the '+' and '=' characters to encode any binary message. Of course, this encoding
increases the size of the message by 33% because three bytes (24 bits) gets encoded as
four bytes. Each character takes up one byte, but there are only 64 (26) possibilities
per character, so only six bits of information can be stored. Base64 is frequently used
to encode binary objects when only text characters are allowed.
4.8.3 Signals
Pidgin has an extensive selection of callbacks (Pidgin calls them signals), which makes
event-driven programming quite simple. In the plugin initialization function, callback
functions of particular types are linked to signals. Signals range from "conversation-
created" and "chat-joined" to "quitting" and "playing-sound-event". However, only
a handful of these signals is actually useful to the ICE protocol.
IM signals
The signals sending-im-msg and receiving-im-msg are used for running the ICE
protocol over an instant message conversation between two users. The sending-im-msg
signal is emitted after the user tries to send a message in an IM window. It gives
the plugin a chance to replace the outgoing text with whatever the plugin wants to
print. In our case, we can take the text and create a text message with a signature,
before passing it on to the recipient. Also, if we think the recipient does not have our
certificate and/or username, we send our certificate-identity message right before our
text message. On the recipient's side, the receiving-im-msg is emitted right before
displaying the contents to the user. Again, this signal allows the plugin to replace the
incoming text with anything. This is where we call RECEIVEMSG, and in the normal
case, verify the message's digital signature, extract the message text, and display it
in the IM window.
Chat signals
In the design described in Section 3.5, we attach a callback to the conversation-created
signal which would send out a chat certificate-identity message if any of the users in
the chat did not have this user's certificate or username-certificate binding. Our final
design ended up being rather different.
ICM is unable to obtain the list of the users in the chat as soon as Alice joins.
When the chat is created (conversation-created), the Pidgin C-structure contains
an empty list of users. Even after the chat-joined signal, the list of users is still
unpopulated. Soon after, chat-buddy-joined signals are emitted, one for each user
in the chatroom. There is no way for the plugin to know when it has a complete list
of the users in the chat. Therefore, we are forced to choose between processing each
user individually (as a callback to chat-buddy-joined), or to wait until Alice wants
to send a message before initiating the ICE protocol. We chose the latter, because
processing each user individually would certainly incur more overhead.
We used a callback for the sending-chat-msg signal. When Alice joins a chat,
ICM actually does nothing. ICM only sends out Alice's certificate-identity message
to the chatroom if at least one user in the chatroom needs it. However, ICM waits to
send out Alice's certificate-identity message until right before she is about to send a
normal text message to the chat.
On the receiving end, the plugin reacts to the receiving-chat-msg signal. If
necessary, the plugin automatically replies to a chat message via IM. For exam-
ple, suppose Dan and Fred are in a chat when Alice joins. Alice's plugin sends her
certificate-identity message, as well as a text message. If Dan's plugin needs to reply
with his certificate-identity, it IMs Alice directly. There is no need to reply to the
chat, because Fred's plugin presumably already has Dan's certificate.
One of the main disadvantages of our design is apparent when using a low-
bandwidth link. If Alice wants to send her first message, she must first send a much
larger message to the chat containing her certificate. Then, she can send her text
message. The overall latency of sending her text message, when preceded by her
certificate-identity message, can be increased significantly.
Alternatively, we could have implemented the plugin to wait several seconds after
joining before trying to retrieve the list of users. Then, the plugin could determine
whether to send the user's certificate to the chat.
There are several Jabber-specific [11, 30] aspects to our implementation. For
example, Jabber allows users to choose a "handle" when entering a chat. By default,
a user's handle is their username, as registered with the server. When a message
is received in a chat, the "sender" is chatname@server/handle. Usually, in an IM
message, the format of the "sender" is username@server/resource.
For example, suppose Alice's and Bob's usernames are Alice@server/Home
and Bob@server/Home. Let Alice and Bob be in a chatroom (CoolKids@server),
with handles Alice and Bob, respectively. Bob sends a message to CoolKids@server/Alice,
the server will translate the recipient and route it to Alice@server, but the
"sender" will be CoolKids@server/Bob. However, if Bob sent an message
to Alice@server/Home, then the "sender" would be Bob@server/Home.
For these reasons, we currently do not support handles in this format. We assume
that a user's handle is their username as well. In the future, we may create a binding
between the handle and the certificate.
Another Jabber-specific quirk that we had to deal with is chat history. The Jabber
server can be configured to send all or some of the messages from the chat to the user
who is just joining. This feature makes certificate exchange very easy, but is a poor
model for limited communication. In our tests (Section 5.2), we turned the chat
history feature off.
4.8.4 Pidgin GUI/Preferences
Pidgin uses the GIMP Toolkit (GTK) to display its graphical user interface (GUI).
Pidgin makes it pretty easy to load and unload plugins, and also to provide a configu-
ration GUI. Preferences, specific to a particular plugin, can be stored in an XML file
along with other Pidgin preferences. These allow us to store any state that we want,
but we use a database to store most of our state anyway. The two preferences that
we do store are a path to the database, and a URL to query for OCSP responses.
These preferences can be altered in the ICM configuration window.
Figure 4-4: Pidgin Plugin Configuration Window
The ICM configuration window (as shown in Figure 4-4) also provides a simple
front-end to load a few select cryptographic items into the database. Users may add
X509 certificates, RSA private keys and certificate revocation lists via our GUI. These
are added by typing in a path to the desired item.
We thought that indicating to the users whether a message has been verified would
be very useful. A similar problem is solved by popular web browsers by showing a
lock icon when using TLS [27]. At first, we considered simply coloring the text in
the IM/chat windows. This would be extremely easy to implement since the text
is encoded in HTML. Green text could be verified, while unverified text could be
red. The problem with this approach is that these colors could be faked by the user
changing their text to green (or red). One alternative that we came up with was
to include a small image with verified messages. Images can only be sent between
users in Pidgin by establishing a "direct connection". Plugins have another way to
insert images, so malicious users would have a lot of difficulty spoofing a verified
message. See Figure 4-5 for Alice's conversation with Dan. Further improvements to
UI-security notifications will be the subject of future work.
Figure 4-5: Sample Pidgin Instant Message Conversation
4.8.5 Initialization
There are a few things that are done by the plugin, and that need to be done by
the user before the ICM plugin can be used properly. First, the plugin checks to see
whether there is a path to the database in the preferences file. If there is a path, the
plugin opens the database. However, if there is no path, the plugin simply creates a
database in the current directory named with the account's username by loading the
schema from a file. This default behavior is also reflected by setting this path in the
preferences file.
The user has to load at least one certificate and one private key, obtained from an
appropriate authority. Without these two items, a user cannot participate in authen-
ticated messaging. The items may be loaded in any order, with the exception that
a CA-signed certificate should be loaded after its signing CA and the corresponding
certificate revocation list. That is, the CA and CRL should be loaded before the
other certificate, so that the second certificate can be verified properly. Also, the last
certificate to be loaded via the configuration window is the certificate that is used
in the ICE protocol. Similarly, the last private key loaded is used to sign messages
in the ICE protocol. In one of our tests, we used two certificates, one private key,
and one certificate revocation list. One of the certificates was a self-signed certificate
authority. The other was a user certificate signed by that CA.
4.8.6 Multiple accounts
Pidgin can support multiple account simultaneously, even using different protocols.
However, ICM currently only supports a single application's notion of identity at a
time. Therefore, if a user is logged into multiple accounts in the same application,
then ICM is unable to know which identity to exchange with other users.
There are two possible solutions to handling multiple accounts in the future. First,
an ICM instance can be created for each account, but that would greatly increase
the complexity of the plugin. Another option is to modify ICM to handle a list of
accounts, and pass information about which account is being used to every function.

Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this chapter, we discuss our testing and evaluation of the ICM system and ICE
protocol.
5.1 Testing - Module
We implemented the ICM system from the bottom up, writing and performing unit
tests along the way for each of the three major modules (DB, CryptoLib and Ex-
change). We simply wrote executables that would cover all of the different functions.
5.1.1 testdb
The DB test executable (testdb) is script-like in that it simply creates a new database
and performs different operations on it. All of the DB layer functions perform one
or more INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE or DELETE operations. Naturally we call
functions to insert rows into the database tables before selecting/updating/deleting
them. The tests output debugging feedback to indicate which tests have passed
successfully. To determine whether a test was successful, we hardcoded the expected
results, and matched them with the output of the SELECT functions. We did not
perform any thread safety or multiple access tests.
5.1.2 testcryptolib
The CryptoLib test executable (testcryptolib) is similar to testdb in that it tests
most of the functions individually. There is some set-up required before running
testcryptolib.
Setup
One of the main purposes of the CryptoLib module is to manipulate and validate
certificates. In order to test certificate handling, we generated our own certificates,
complete with a certificate authority and certificate revocation list. See Appendix B
for OpenSSL commands to generate these test files.
In order to test OCSP validation (see Section 4.5.2), we need to run an OCSP
responder. OpenSSL has a simple OCSP responder that can be run as described
in Appendix B. This responder uses files created in the process of generating the
certificate authority (the CA's certificate, private key and index). The index contains
information (including validity status) on all of the certificates signed by the CA.
Testing
The order in which certificates are inserted into the database by the CryptoLib module
is important. Every certificate is validated before inserting it into the database.
Therefore, we insert the CA's certificate first so that the subsequent certificates'
signatures can be verified. Also, we insert the CRL before the CA-signed certificates.
The CRL is also used when verifying whether a certificate is valid. We tested inserting
a valid certificate, a revoked certificate, a valid certificate while the OCSP responder
was unavailable. Then we performed a few sanity checks. For example, we verifyed
that the same certificate was the same length in DER format when stored in two
different databases.
5.1.3 testexchange
The Exchange test executable mainly checks the logic of the functions implementing
the ICE protocol. We tested creating a number of typical common-case messages, as
well as all sorts of error-inducing messages. We make sure that MSGPACK can take
a Msg and produce a bytestring that the MSGUNPACK function can use to reproduce
the original Msg.
Most of the ICE protocol logic resides in the CREATECERTIDMSG and RE-
CEIVEMSG. Therefore, most of the testexchange tests focus on these two functions.
We performed four tests on CREATECERTIDMSG by simply varying the three
parameters to cover the different parts of the code. First, we provided no inputs, but
had the request flag set to true. This message is the response when we receive an ICE
message for which we do not have a certificate. We know neither the sender's certifi-
cate nor identity, so both parameters are NULL. The second test involved knowing
both the recipient's identity and certificate. This is a common case where the recip-
ient has just sent us a certificate-identity message. The third test involved knowing
the only the identity of the recipient. This might happen if the we join a chat and see
only one user that does not have our certificate. Finally, the circumstances of the last
test were similar to the previous one's. We only had the recipient's identity, but we
happened to have a corresponding certificate in our database for that identity. This
happens when we see a user in a chatroom for which we have a certificate, but for
some reason we have not sent our certificate to them.
5.2 Testing - System
Our system evaluation tests checked for protocol correctness (expected behavior vs.
observed behavior), and performance overhead. The performance metrics cover the
number and size of the messages that we send, and compare them to the messages
produced without using the ICE protocol.
In the following sections, we describe tests for IM scenarios and chat scenarios. We
constructed these scenarios as combinations of username changes, certificate changes,
and database failures. Often, multiple different scenarios result in the same behavior
from the ICE protocol. We also describe how many bytes are saved in each scenario
assuming a single text message from each user. We will compare these results to an
S/MIME scheme that attaches a certificate to every message (see Appendix A.4).
All of the numbers in the following tests do not include overhead associated with
XMPP. All of the messages, both ICE and S/MIME, are Base64 encoded, so in that
respect, they are identical. The certificates used contain 1024-bit RSA keys, and
when we refer to Alice's certificate, both in the context of ICE and S/MIME, we are
actually referring to the same X.509 certificate.
5.2.1 Scenarios - IM
In all of the following scenarios, Alice is trying to send a message to Dan, but one or
both of them may not have the other's certificate. In the Table 5.1, we enumerate ten
scenarios. Scenario 1 involves both Alice and Dan without each other's information.
Scenarios 2-4 involve one or more changes in username. Scenario 5 is the result of a
successful exchange of certificates and bindings. Scenarios 6-8 involve old certificates,
and finally Scenarios 9 and 10 involve database failures.
In order to clarify which cryptographic item is being specified, "alice", "notalice",
"oldalice", alice@ll, and oldalice@ll refer to the current binding, wrong binding, old
binding (associated with the wrong certificate), current certificate and old certificates,
respectively. Parallel terms are used for Dan and Fred.
For the Savings column in the following tables, we calculated how many Bytes
are saved for a "conversation" in which each user sends a single message "hi". For
S/MIME, the "hi" message was 2403B, 2383B and 2371B for Alice, Dan and Fred,
respectively. Therefore, the maximum possible savings in an instant message con-
versation between Alice and Dan is 4786 Bytes. The maximum savings for a chat
between all three users is 7157 Bytes.
Note that in Table 5.1, a user never has a binding without a certificate, because
the binding is a link between a username and a certificate. Without the certificate,
the binding cannot be authenticated. Suppose Alice and Dan had each other's bind-
# Alice has Dan has Observed Savings (B)
1 "alice"/alice@ll - D 4786 - 3100
A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1686
2* "notdan" "notalice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ D 4786 - 1940
dan@ll alice@ 11 A +- "dan" 2846
3* "notdan" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -- D 4786 - 1940
dan@ll alice@ll A +- "dan" 2846
4 "dan" "notalice" "alice" -+ D 4786 - 604
dan@ll alice~ll 4182
5 "dan" "alice" (nothing) 4786 - 400
dan@ll alice@ll 4386
6 "olddan" "alice" msg -+ D 4786 - 1760
olddan@ll alice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 3026
7 "dan" "oldalice" msg -+ D 4786 - 3104
dan@ll oldalice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1682
"alice"/alice@ll -+ D
8 "olddan" "oldalice" msg -+ D 4786 - 3104
olddan@ll oldalice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1682
"alice"/alice@ll -+ D
9 "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ D 4786- 3100
alice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1686
10 "dan" msg -+ D 4786 - 3104
dan@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1682
"alice" /alice@ll -+ D
Table 5.1: IM Scenarios
ings and certificates, but Alice gets a new certificate. Dan would not have the new
certificate, nor the new binding between the name "Alice" and Alice's new certificate.
Therefore, the situation is the same as Dan having neither Alice's certificate nor her
binding. In practice, the only difference is that a warning is shown to Dan alerting
him to the fact that he had previously had a different certificate for Alice's username.
The scenarios marked with an * are special because the observed behavior is
different from what we might expect. alice@ll is sent along with "alice", because
Alice cannot associate "dan" with dan@ll. She knows that she has sent alice@ll to
the owner of dan@ll, but she has a binding for "notdan" and dan@ll. The reverse
case does not occur (Scenario 4) because Dan receives "alice", and therefore knows
he does not need to send his certificate. In Scenario 9, Alice sends both "alice" and
alice@ll because she has no record that dan already has those items.
In Scenario 6, how does Dan know to send Alice his binding and certificate? The
answer lies within the acknowledgment field of our message format (see Section 4.6.2).
Alice acknowledges the wrong certificate for Dan, so Dan responds appropriately.
5.2.2 Scenarios - Chat
Scenarios for chats are significantly more complicated (and numerous!). There are a
few situational aspects that we keep constant. First, there are 3 users in the chat:
Alice, Dan and Fred. Second, Alice is always entering the chat last, and sending a
message as soon as she arrives. Third, Dan and Fred have already exchanged each
other's certificates and bindings.
Scenario 1 is the situation where Alice has never communicated with Dan or
Fred. Scenarios 2-9 involve different usernames. Scenario 10 is the result of successful
exchange of certificates and bindings among all three users. Scenarios 11-13 involve
old certificates. Finally, Scenarios 14-17 involve database failures.
#11 Alice has Dan has Fred has Observed Savings(B)
1 "fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157 - 4612
fred@ll dan@ll A -"dan"/dan@ll 2545
A +- "fred"/fred@ll
2 "notdan" "notalice" "notalice" "alice"/alice@ll - chat 7157 - 2304
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A +- "dan" 4853
"notfred" "fred" "dan" A - "fred"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
3 "notdan" "notalice" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157 - 2304
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A +- "dan" 4853
"notfred" "fred" "dan" A +- "fred"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
4 "notdan" "alice" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157 - 2304
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A +- "dan" 4853
"notfred" "fred" "dan" A +- "fred"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
5 "dan" "notalice" "notalice" "alice"/alice@ll - chat 7157 - 2104
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A +- "fred" 5053
"notfred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
6 "dan" "notalice" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll - chat 7157 - 2104
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A -- "fred" 5053
"notfred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
7 "dan" "alice" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157- 2104
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll A +- "fred" 5053
"notfred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
8 "dan" "notalice" "notalice" "alice" - chat 7157 - 756
dan@ll alice@ll alice@ll 6401
"fred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
9 "dan" "notalice" "alice" "alice" -+ chat 7157 - 756
dan@ll aliceell alicell 6401
"fred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
10 "dan" "alice" "alice" (nothing) 7157- 564
alice@ll alice@ll alice@ll 6593
"fred" "fred" "dan"
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
Table 5.2: Chat Scenarios, part 1
Scenario 1 is probably the most typical scenario; the users already present in the
chat (Dan and Fred) have exchanged certificates/bindings, and a new user is joining
the chat. Alice recognizes that she has sent her certificate/binding to neither Dan nor
Fred, so she sends her certificate-identity message to the chat. Dan and Fred both
respond directly to Alice with their respective certificate-identity messages.
Scenario 5 involves two new usernames. Alice has switched from "notalice" to
"alice", while Fred has switched from "notfred" to "fred". Alice sees that she has
sent her certificate-identity to neither Dan nor Fred, so she sends it to the chat. Fred
has not sent his newest binding to alice@ll, so he sends it.
Scenario 7 tests one user changing names (from "notfred" to "fred"). Note that
Alice sends her certificate needlessly, but Fred only sends his binding.
Scenario 8 shows off some special case code; Alice recognizes that she has sent her
certificate to both Dan and Fred, but has changed her username since then. Therefore,
she sends only her new binding to the chat.
Scenario 10 is the simple case of everybody having exchanged information already.
# Alice has Dan has Fred has Observed Savings (B)
11 "olddan" "alice" "alice" A -+ chat 7157 - 3272
olddan@ll alice@ll alice@ll chat +- D 3885
"fred" "fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll - D
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll A -- "dan"/dan@ll
12 "olddan" "oldalice" "alice" A -> chat 7157 - 3272
olddan@ll oldalice@ll alice@ll A &- "dan"/dan@ll 3885
"fred" "fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll -+ D
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
13 "dan" "oldalice" "alice" A -4 chat 7157 - 5968
dan@ll oldalice@ll alice@ll A -- "dan"/dan@ll 1189
"oldfred" "fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll -+ D
oldfred@ll fred@ll dan@ll chat - F
"alice"/alice@ll -4 F
A +- "fred"/fred@ll
14 "dan" "oldalice" "alice" A -+ chat 7157 - 3272
dan@ll oldalice@ll alice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 3885
"fred" "fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll -+ D
fred@ll fred@ll dan@ll
15 "alice" "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157 - 7316
alice@ll alice@ll chat +- D -159
"fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll - D
fred@ll dan@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll
chat +- F
"alice"/alice@ll -+ F
A -- "fred"/fred@ll
16 "dan" "alice" A - chat 7157 - 3272
dan@ll alice@ll A "dan"/dan@ll 3885
"fred" "dan" "alice"/alice@ll - D
fred@ll dan@ll
17 "alice" "alice"/alice@ll -+ chat 7157 - 5968
alice@ll A +- "dan"/dan@ll 1189
"dan" chat +- F
dan@ll "alice"/alice@ll -+ F
A +-- "fred"/fred@ll
Table 5.3: Chat Scenarios, part 2
Scenario 11 has some strange behavior. Alice thinks she has Dan's and Fred's
certificates/bindings, but she actually has Dan's old certificate and binding. However,
she sends her message to the chat, without any problems. It is only when Dan sends
a message to the chat that Alice realizes she has the wrong certificate for him. She
then requests his certificate and binding, and he sends them to her.
Scenario 15 shows how a database failure can cause many extra communications.
Alice's database has died, but Dan and Fred believe Alice still has their certificates
and bindings. Alice does not know that they already have her information. She sends
her certificate/binding to the chat, but receives no responses. When Dan and Fred
send messages to the chat, Alice has to request their certificates/bindings individually.
If all of the users had universal knowledge, Dan and Fred would have just sent their
certificates/bindings to Alice. Instead, there are three extra messages containing
Alice's certificate/binding; the initial one to the chat, and the two individual ones
to Dan and Fred. The overhead is associated only with the failure-induced "pull"
method of exchange; Alice is requesting information directly, instead of Dan/Fred
knowing that that she needs their information.
Note how the savings in Table 5.3 are small, and even negative in Scenario 15.
These numbers, as well as all the savings numbers for chat scenarios, are misleading
when considering a network without true multicast. If Alice, Dan and Fred are all
within transmission distance of each other in a wireless network, then they do have
true multicast. That is, Alice can send a message to both Dan and Fred for the
same price as a message to only Dan (or only Fred). If Alice, Dan and Fred are on
a switched network, then at some point, Alice's message to Dan and Fred must be
replicated. Therefore, the cost to send to both Dan and Fred is essentially the cost
of sending to Dan plus the cost of sending to Fred.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
In the Scenarios discussed earlier in this chapter, we compared the performance of
our protocol to S/MIME. Our protocol improves on S/MIME in three ways (two are
specific to a wireless network):
* Message Size: we produce smaller messages since certificates are not sent every
time;
* Shorter Transmission Latency: smaller messages can be sent faster, usually
certificates do not need to be transmitted;
* Lower Power Consumption: fewer/smaller messages require less power to trans-
mit.
It is possible to send an S/MIME message without attaching the signing certificate.
However, the resulting messages (for text "hi") are all 1197B, as compared to Alice's
2403B, Dan's 2383B and Fred's 2371B. The same message is about 200B in the ICE
protocol (no certificate attached).
Calculating the performance gains over a "typical" conversation, or over a given
period of time requires some numbers that are not easily obtained. We will assume
that a typical conversation involves 25 messages, each averaging 30 characters, trans-
mitted over 5 minutes [33]. Assuming that certificates and bindings are exchanged
once in the ICE protocol, a typical conversation between Alice and Dan amounts
to 8604B. If Alice and Dan were using S/MIME, the same conversation would be
60525B. If they only exchanged their certificates once, but still used S/MIME for
the remaining messages, the conversation size would be 33017B. Applications that do
not involve transferring large amounts of data are likely to have certificate exchange
constitute a large percentage of overall transmissions.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, we explore possibilities for future work, summarize what I learned
over the course of this project, and conclude.
6.1 Future Work
In this section, we discuss areas that could use future development. These are features
and ideas that we, in our limited time, did not implement.
6.1.1 Multiple Applications
As explained earlier (page 29), there are tables in the database schema provisioning
for allowing multiple applications to use ICM simultaneously. Applications should
then be able to initialize themselves properly with their own bindings.
6.1.2 MID/Hash Collisions
We use hashes and especially MIDs to represent different Entities and Items. However,
in the unlikely event that there is a collision (e.g. two different Entities with the same
MID), we would like our performance to degrade gracefully. Right now, we simply
do not handle collisions, and an error is displayed. Handling collisions can be quite
simple in some cases, like trying to verify the signature of a message given the signing
certificate's MID. All the matching certificates can be tried, until one succeeds. Other
cases are likely to be more complex, such as trying to find the certificate associated
with a given Entity's MID. If there are two distinct Entities with the same MID, then
we may think we have a user's certificate when we actually do not.
6.1.3 Service
We would like a single user's multiple applications to be able to use the same ICM
simultaneously. Right now, this is possible by using the same SQLite database back-
end. However, we would like to have an ICM service running in the background on
the user's machine. Then, applications wishing to use ICM would make requests to
and process responses from the ICM service process. The ICM would have to be
modified to register and verify application IDs so that application-specific settings
are maintained.
Yet another step would be to make the ICM service run on a server, perhaps
accessible via the Internet. This would be significantly more involved and dangerous;
it would obviously be a major problem if our service gets compromised. A secure
scheme to authenticate users to the server would be absolutely necessary. After the
authentication problem is solved, an encryption scheme would also be necessary to
ensure that eavesdroppers cannot steal items like private keys off the wire. A secure
ICM service accessible from anywhere would be useful to users who work on different
machines.
6.1.4 OCSP
We allow for optional OCSP validation of certificates. For simplicity, we ask the
application for a URL which would handle our OCSP requests. Sometimes, in one
of the optional X.509v3 extension fields, there is a URL for the appropriate OCSP
responder. A simple extension of ICM would be to parse these fields in search of such
URLs.
6.1.5 Thunderbird Extension
We tout ICM as a library that can be used by multiple applications for authenticated
communication. However, we only had time to implement one example, a Pidgin
plugin (Section 4.8). Writing a Thunderbird extension would be a great way to show
ICM's versatility.
6.1.6 Pidgin Plugin
There are several usability features that can be added to the plugin. First, when a
user receives a certificate, show that certificate's information in a new GTK window.
Allow the user to accept or decline to trust that certificate. Also, when a user is using
a "new" certificate, show both the new and old certificates, again with an option to
decline to use the new one. However, whether this would improve security/usability
depends on the user; many users are accustomed to simply clicking through pop-up
dialogs until the application works as expected.
Another feature that might be useful is re-verification of old messages. Suppose
Alice sends several messages to Bob before she receives his request for her certificate.
Then all of those messages would show up as unverified to Bob. With the new feature,
Bob's ICM would be able to verify Alice's older messages.
6.1.7 Browser-based GUI
webpy is a Python-based webserver that would allow us to write a GUI that could be
accessed via a user's browser. This GUI would provide a more usable interface to our
database than our commandline-based Admin program.
6.1.8 Certificate Retrieval via URL
Suppose Alice uses a personal digital assistant (PDA) and wants to send her identity-
certificate to Bob, who is on broadband. One possible extension of our ICM would
be to allow users to send URLs in place of their certificates. Then, in our example,
Alice could just send a URL for Bob to download her certificate. This would save
Alice precious bandwidth and power on her PDA.
6.2 What I Learned
Over the course of this project (designing and implementing ICE and ICM), I learned
a lot, from how to use certain developer tools to secure programming practices. I
used emacs [8] as my IDE, but I had never used tags [6] to navigate through third-
party libaries. This was invaluable, especially when trying to comprehend OpenSSL's
cryptography library. Other tools that I became familiar with include Subversion [24]
(a versioning system) and Doxygen [5] (a documentation tool).
One of the most important skills that I acquired is writing/editing Makefiles.
Using Makefiles made building my project infinitely easier; compiling each source file
individually would have been very tedious and time-consuming. I also learned to use
GCC from MinGW [13] compiler under the cygwin [3] shell, since we performed most
of our development on Windows [28].
The three open-source/free libraries that we used (SQLite [23], OpenSSL [17] and
ACE [25]) were also new to me. While the SQLite online documentation was superb, I
had to rely on books ([37] and [34]) to get a grasp on the OpenSSL and ACE libraries.
Finally, there were several secure programming practices that I learned to use.
For example, to prevent buffer overflow attacks, one must use safe string functions
(strncpy, strncat), instead of their unsafe and more common counterparts (strcpy,
strcat). Also, when building a SQL query for the database, one must use bind pa-
rameters to accept user input, instead of simply concatenating the statement together.
Otherwise, the system is vulnerable to SQL-injection attacks.
6.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have designed and implemented an Identity and Certificate Manager
(ICM) library for storing and using applications' identities and digital certificates. We
also designed an efficient protocol, called Identity and Certificate Exchange (ICE),
allowing users' ICMs to exchange identities and certificates. We demonstrated the
use of both ICM and ICE in by writing a Pidgin plugin.

Appendix A
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a system designed to simplify authentication (the
act of checking to see whether a person is who he says he is, and whether he wrote
what he said he wrote). PKI follows a hierarchical trust-based model with each node
in the hierarchy representing a certificate. Any certificate that is not a leaf in the
hierarchy is called a certificate authority. The certificate authority at the top of the
hierarchy is called a root certificate authority.
PKI relies on cryptographic digital signatures. Digital signatures are similar to
normal signatures in that they are only easy for one person to create, but anybody
can verify them to see that they are authentic. A certificate authority encloses a
signature in any certificate that it issues. A root certificate authority signs its own
certificate.
The basic concept of a PKI is that trust can be transitive, i.e. if Alice trusts Bob
to trust other people, and Bob trusts Charles, then Alice can trust Charles. In this
simple example, Bob would be the certificate authority (CA), trusted by Alice. If the
CA signs a certificate (like Charles'), that signifies that the CA trusts that Charles
is actually Charles (presumably after doing some other kind of authentication). If
Alice trusts Bob to verify people's identities, then she trusts that Charles' certificate
belongs to Charles.
A.1 Certificates (X.509)
X.509 is an ITU-T standard adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
in RFC3280. There are many useful fields in an X.509 certificate. For example,
there's a field called "Subject" which details the person or organization represented
by that particular certificate. There are subfields in Subject including common name
(often the name of the person), email, organization, state, country, etc. Common
names are often used by applications to verify identity. X.509's also have two dates,
delimiting the period during which the certificate is considered valid. There is also
a field called "Issuer" which has the same subfields as "Subject". The Issuer is the
certificate authority which issued, and therefore trusts this certificate. Perhaps most
importantly, all certificates enclose a public key. Some public keys are for digital
signatures, allowing anyone possessing the certificate to authenticate any message
signatures from the owner of the certificate. Therefore, if Charles wants Alice to
be able to authenticate her messages, he sends her his own certificate, and signs his
messages.
A.2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
A certificate whose validity period has not ended yet may need to be invalidated for
some reason. An example is if Alice worked for a company which issued her a cer-
tificate, but she was fired. One solution is called a certificate revocation list (CRL),
which is also specified in RFC3280. A CRL lists certificates that have been "revoked",
which means that the certificate authority has invalidated them. Certificate authori-
ties are supposed to generate CRLs periodically. Theoretically, anyone trusting this
certificate authority should be checking for new certificate revocation lists often, so
that the certificates can be confirmed valid.
CRLs have three main problems. They may become very large files; downloading
one could be a lot of overhead if only one certificate needs to be validated. The
second problem is that users often forget or do not even bother to check for CRLs.
Finally, for very large CAs, CRLs need to be published very often, since certificates
are revoked frequently.
A.3 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a possible replacement for downloading
CRLs, and is specified in RFC2560. An OCSP responder is a server that keeps track
of what certificates' statuses are (usually the CA). If Alice wants to find out whether
Bob's certificate is still valid, she can send an OCSP request to the OCSP responder,
and then receive information only pertaining to Bob's certificate. OCSP requests
and responses are very small; only the hash algorithm, issuer's hashed name, issuer's
hashed public key, and the certificate's serial number are included for each certificate.
The size of an OCSP request is 41B + 64B*n where n is the number of certificates
being verified. Two advantages of OCSP over CRLs are that the information gathered
is more up-to-date, and no much less extraneous information is transmitted. One
disadvantage of OCSP is that it requires the status checking to be done online.
A.4 (S/MIME)
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions is a standard for encapsulating en-
crypted and signed electronic mail. S/MIME requires the use of private keys and
certificates from an appropriate Certificate Authority. Typically, S/MIME is used for
generating digital signatures of messages, providing authentication, message integrity,
and non-repudiation properties. Authentication gives the recipient information attest-
ing that the message was written by the holder of the private key. Message integrity
provides assurance that the message was not tampered with after the signature was
generated. Finally, non-repudiation makes it difficult for the signer to deny authoring
the message. [22]

Appendix B
OpenSSL
In this chapter, we illustrate the OpenSSL commands used to generate test certifi-
cates, keys, CRLs, etc. Please refer to Appendix A for information on any of the
aforementioned terms. We used OpenSSL-0.9.8e in this project.
B.1 Creating Certificates
First, we set up our own Certificate Authority (CA). For detailed instructions on how
to do this, see [16]. Be sure to download the openssl.cnf file. After we have our CA
set up, we go on to create our own private key and certificate pairs:
openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 info.txt -keyout key.pem -out req.csr
Note: we use RSA 1024-bit keys (yes, admittedly weak). Larger keys can easily be
generated, as well as keys using other kinds of cryptography, such as elliptical curve
cryptography (ECC).
The above command will produce a certificate request file (req.csr) and a private
key file (key.pem). To sign the request and produce a certificate:
openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -in req.csr -out cert.pem
As might be suspected, the newly signed certificate is cert.pem. In order to verify
that a certificate was signed by a given CA, we use the following command:
openssl verify -CAfile ca-cert.pem cert.pem
This command allows us to establish a chain of trust; i.e. if we trust the CA
(ca-cert.pem), then we can trust the certificate (cert.pem).
B.2 Revoking Certificates
Now that we know how to create certificates, we might want to revoke invalid certifi-
cates:
openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -revoke cert.pem
However, just revoking a certificate is insufficient; users need to be notified. One
way users can stay up-to-date on the latest revoked certificates is to periodically
download certificate revocation lists (CRLs). To generate a CRL:
openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -gencrl -out ca-crl.pem
Now, we just need to put ca-crl.pem in a place where users can easily down-
load it. ca-crl.pem contains the serial numbers (unique for a given CA) of revoked
certificates.
B.3 S/MIME
S/MIME provides a standard for digital signatures in email, as well as an option for
encryption. To create a signed email from a text file named msg.txt:
openssl smime -sign -in msg.txt -text -out signed.msg
-signer cert.pem -inkey key.pem
The output is signed.msg. Why do we need to include the "-signer" certificate?
S/MIME includes the signing certificate by default. Of course the private key is
needed as well. If we want to explicitly exclude the signing certificate, we simply add
"-nocerts" as an extra argument to the above command.
On the other end, how do we verify a signed S/MIME email?
openssl smime -verify -in signed.msg -CAfile ca-cert.pem
The above command only works if the signing certificate is included in the mes-
sage. If the certificate is not included, then it must be specified by hand, with the
"-certfile" option.
B.4 OCSP
OCSP is an abbreviation of Open Certificate Status Protocol (see Appendix A.3 for
details). To run an OCSP responder, use the following command:
openssl ocsp -index index -port 8888 -rsigner ca-certkey.pem
-CA ca-cert.pem
ca-certkey.pem is the concatenation of ca-cert.pem and ca-key.pem (the cer-
tificate's private key). The "-rsigner" option allows us to sign our OCSP responses,
so that the requester can have some assurance that the response was not falsified.
The OCSP responder can be run on any port, but in this example, it is running on
port 8888.
To send an OCSP request from the commandline, use the following command:
openssl ocsp -url http://ocsp.org:8888 -issuer ca-cert.pem
-cert cert.pem
This sends an OCSP request to the OCSP responder running on ocsp.org on
port 8888 for the certificate cert.pem.

Appendix C
Writing C Wrappers for C++
Functions
C++ has classes, while C does not. So then, how do we use C++ libraries from C?
The solution involves a few steps, but the main idea is that a void* generic pointer
can be used to point to instances of a C++ class. The other important points are
to use extern "C" around the C++ function declarations, and to have all the C++
included files in the .cpp file as opposed to in the .h (header) file. Below are a simple
C++ class and its header file.
ace hello.h
#include "ace/OS.h"
#include "ace/LogMsg.h"
class Hello {
public:
Hello(ACE_TCHAR* name);
~Hello();
void printHelloName();
private:
ACE_TCHAR* myName;
acehello.cpp
#include "ace_hello.h"
Hello::Hello(ACE_TCHAR* name) { myName = name; }
Hello::~Hello() {}
void Hello::printHelloName() {
ACE_DEBUG((LM_INFO, "Hello, %s!\n", myName));
}
Note that there is nothing special about these files. Below, we have the C wrappers
for this class.
chello.h
struct hello_st {
void* hello;
typedef struct hello_st cHELLO;
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
int HELLO_new(cHELLO* cHello, unsigned char* name);
int HELLOprint(cHELLO cHello);
#ifdef __cplusplus
#
#endif
chello.cpp
#include "c_hello.h"
#include "ace-hello.h"
#define cHELLO2Hello(cHELLO) (Hello*) cHELLO.hello
int HELLOnew(cHELLO* cHello, unsigned char* name) {
Hello* h;
ACE_NEWNORETURN(h, Hello(reinterpretcast<ACE_TCHAR*> (name)));
cHELLO result;
result.hello = h;
*cHello = result;
return 0;
int HELLOprint(cHELLO cHello) {
Hello* h = cHELLD2Hello(cHello);
h->printHelloName ();
return 0;
Note that we use a struct similarly named to hold a void* pointer to the C++ ob-
ject. Also, note the extern "C" statement in the header file, surrounded by #ifdef
__cplusplus and #endif preprocessor commands. This allows chello.h to be in-
cluded by C++ files (c_hello. cpp) as well as C files (hello. c) as shown below. The
other items to note in chello.cpp are that it includes another C++-only header
(acelhello.h), and the conversion of inputs from C-friendly types to the real C++
types.
hello.c
#include "c_hello.h"
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
cHELLO h;
if (argv[1])
HELLO_new(&h, argv[l]);
else
HELLO_new(&h, "some guy");
HELLO_print(h);
In the Makefile, note that gcc is used to compile the hello. c file, while g++ is
used to compile the rest of the files, including the shared libraries (libhello.dll
and libchello.dll). We marked the C wrappers by prepending the wrapped class
name with c_.
Makefile
ACE_ROOT="C:\ACE_wrappers"
CPPFLAGS=-I${ACEROOT}
LDFLAGS=-L${ACE_ROOT}/ace -1ACE
CPP=g++
CC=gcc
objects = ace-hello.o
.PHONY: clean all
all: $(objects) libhello.dll libchello.dll hello
libhello.dll: $(objects)
$(CPP) -shared \$(objects) $(LDFLAGS) -o libhello.dll
libchello.dll: libhello.dll c_hello.o
$(CPP) -shared c_hello.o -L. -llibhello $(LDFLAGS) -o libchello.dll
hello: hello.c
$(CC) -o hello.o -c hello.c
$(CPP) -o hello hello.o -L. -lchello
acehello.o: acehello.h
chello.o: chello.h
clean:
-rm -f *.exe *.o *~ *.dll

Appendix D
Building ICM
This appendix contains build notes ICM, and its dependencies (ACE, SQLite, Pidgin,
OpenSSL).
1. SQLite: Download the latest version of SQLite from http://sqlite.org/download.
When compiling SQLite, be sure to comment out this line in Makefile.in:
# TCC += -DSQLITEOMITLOAD_EXTENSION=1
Without extensions, all uses of ICM's MIDs (see page 25) will be rendered
ineffectual. When we compare the MID to the hashes stored in the database,
we use the prefix extension.
2. ACE: Download the latest version of ACE from http://download.dre.vanderbilt.edu.
Follow the extensive ACE build instructions.
3. OpenSSL: Download the latest version of OpenSSL from http://openssl.org/source.
4. Pidgin: Download the latest source of Pidgin from http://www.pidgin.im/download/source.
If compiling on Windows, be sure to compile in a directory whose path contains
no spaces.
5. ICM: Download the source from Subversion (LL only: http://subversion/svn/sgc/trunk/certmgr)
If debugging, uncomment -DACE_NTRACE=O to turn on ACE tracing.
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